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The Newsmen's Privilege Against




The occasional subpoena to appear and testify before a grand jury
ceased to be a sometime problem for American newsmen in 1969 and
1970, when a sharp increase in subpoenas faced reporters across the
nation.' In particular demand before grand juries were newsmen who
had been reporting widespread social and political turmoil. The grand
juries wanted these journalists to reveal their confidential sources as well
as to surrender their unpublished notes and records, unused
photographs, tape recordings, and television film "outtakes." Newsmen
responded with intensity and solidarity, asserting that their ability to
continue as effective news gatherers would be damaged or destroyed if
they betrayed their confidential sources by testifying. 2 Moreover, they
said, compulsory disclosure of news sources made them agents of
government investigation. As for turning over unused film, files, photos,
and notes, some media adopted the policy of early destruction of
unpublished materials after Time, Life, Newsweek, CBS, NBC, the
Chicago Sun-Times, and others were called upon by subpoena, or in the
name of cooperation with government, to deliver large quantities of news
materials. 3 According to Attorney General Mitchell, the newsmen's
* Director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication, University of Wisconsin.
B.A. 1941, M.A. 1950, Ph.D. 1956, University of Minnesota.
i. COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Spring 1970, at 2-3; EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 7, 1970, at 12;
Fol DIGEST, May-June 1970, at 1.
2. S. Res. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 116 CONG. REC. 4129-31 (1970); Noyes & Newbold,
The Subpoena Problem Today, AM. Soc'Y NEWSPAPER EDITORS BULL., Sept. 1970, at 7-8; EDITOR
& PUBLISHER, Feb. 7, 1970, at 12; see Comment, Constitutional Protection for the Newsman's
Work Product, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Cv. LIB. L. REV. 119 (1970); Note, Reporters and Their
Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
3. COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Spring 1970, at 2-3; STRAUS EDITOR'S REPORT, July 6, 1970,
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willingness to accept contempt convictions and jail terms rather than
reveal confidences, along with their unyielding protests to government,
made the controversy "one of the most difficult issues I have faced
"14
When the barrage of subpoenas began in early 1969, statutes of
some states recognized an evidentiary privilege of journalists not to
reveal confidential sources. 5 In April 1970, the possibility of an
additional protective avenue opened when the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California granted constitutional
protection under the first amendment's freedom of the press clause., By
March 1971, this decision had been upheld and extended; the highest
courts of three states had ruled upon the claim to constitutional
protection with widely divergent results; and at least three petitions had
been filed for Supreme Court review of these decisions in the hope that
certiorari, uniformly denied in earlier similar cases, now would be
granted.
7
This article will examine the decisions since April 1970 and suggest
some implications flowing from them, particularly as they bear on the
constitutional issues. As a prelude, it will seek to summarize the state of
the law on newmen's privilege prior to April 1970.
II. COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE NEWS MEN'S
PRIVILEGE
At common law, the journalist could be compelled to reveal his
sources of information when subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury,
court, or legislature.8 This rule was based on the theory that every man
owed his testimony when called by his government to give evidence in his
possession. Although exceptions were sometimes made for the priest-
penitent, attorney-client, physician-patient, and a few other
at 3; see Gould, House Panel Bids C.B.S. Yield Films, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 1971, at 1, col. I (city
ed.); NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 1971, at 95, col. 1.
4. EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Aug. 15, 1970, at 9-10; Fol DIGEST, May-June 1970, at 1.
5. See notes 11-19 infra and accompanying text.
6. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Cal. 1970); see note 34 infra and
accompanying text.
7. See note 79 infra and accompanying text. For previous denial of certiorari see notes 28 &
32 infra.
8. People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of New York County, 269 N.Y. 291, 293-94, 199 N.E.
415 (1936); Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 591 (1966); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (J. MeNaughton rev.
ed. 1961). For the most exhaustive study of newsmen's privilege, including its historical
development and analysis of reported and unreported cases, see A. Gordon, Protection of News
Sources: The History and Legal Status of the Newsman's Privilege, Dec., 1970 (unpublished
dissertation on file in the University of Wisconsin Library).
[Vol. 24
1971] NEWSMEN'S PRIVILEGE
relationships, the privilege was slow to emerge for newsmen.9 Beginning
in Maryland in 1896, statutes intruded on the common-law position,"0
and by 1970 seventeen states" provided a newsmen's privilege. The
degree of protection under these statutes varies from an absolute
privilege in thirteen states, including Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Ohio, 2
to a privilege qualified by exceptions grounded in malice and bad faith'3
or by a judicial finding that disclosure is essential to the public interest."
The media included range from newspapers only 5 to newspapers, radio
and television, magazines, news agencies, press associations, and wire
services.' 6 Six states protect only the sources of published information;' 7
9. 8 J. WIGIMORE, supra note 8, §§ 2286, 2290 (attorney-client); id. § 2394 (priest-penitent).
10. D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of
Information. 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 324 (1969).
11. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150-.220 (Supp. 1970); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-54 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.945(l) (1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-601-1 to -2 (1964); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 48.087 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1
(1970); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12
(Baldwin 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1971).
In addition, Senator Pearson (Kansas) has introduced a bill into Congress to provide certain
privileges against disclosure of confidential information and the sources of information obtained by
newsmen. S. 1311, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). The Newsmen's Privilege Act of 1971 provides that
newsmen shall not be required by any court, grand jury, agency, department, or commission of the
United States, or by either House of Congress, to disclose any confidential information obtained by
them in their capacity as newsmen. The newsmen's privilege to maintain the confidentiality of news
sources is subject to reasonable qualifications: (f) the privilege does not extend to the source of any
allegedly defamatory information if the defendant, in a civil action for defamation, asserts a defense
based upon the source of the information; (2) the privilege does not extend to the source of any
information concerning the details of any grand jury or other proceeding that is required to be secret
under the laws of the United States; and (3) the privilege may be removed when there is substantial
evidence that disclosure is required to prevent a threat to human life, of espionage, or of foreign
aggression. 117 CONG. REc. 3535 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1971).
12. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 421.100 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1954);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-601-1 to -2 (1964); NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.087 (1968); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (MeKinney Supp. 1971); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1971). For
analysis of these and other privilege statutes see D'Alemberte, supra note 10, at 327-34.
13. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964).
14. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.150- .220 (Supp. 1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:1451-54
(Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (1970).
15. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970).
16. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinneySupp. 1971).
17. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1970); CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1070 (West 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35,
§ 2 (1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970).
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others shield sources of information whether published or not." Only
three statutes grant immunity from testifying about the information
gathered as well as about the sources of information. 9
Reported cases under these statutes are found in Pennsylvania,
California, and New Jersey.20 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re
Taylor,21 expansively construed the statutory phrase "source of
information" to include documents and tape recordings in the
possession of the newspaper as well as the identity of the newspaper's
sources. The court found that the Act must be construed broadly and
that the legislature had determined that the gathering of news and the
protection of the source were of greater importance to the public interest
than the disclosure of the alleged crime or the alleged criminal.
22
In Application of Howard,2 the California Court of Appeals ruled
that when a reporter attributes a statement to a named individual, it does
not follow that the individual was the reporter's "source of
information" for the statement. Since the reporter might have obtained
the statement from others or from a press release, the court ruled that the
reporter had not waived his privilege by attributing the information to a
named individual.
2 4
The New Jersey statute was the basis for a plea of privilege in State
v. Donovan.2 A newspaper's managing editor, in testifying before the
New Jersey Supreme Court Commission, refused to say who had
delivered certain press-release information to the newspaper, although
the newspaper stories themselves had named certain individuals as the
sources of information contained in the press releases. The editor relied
on the statute's privilege against disclosing "the source of any
information procured or obtained . . . and published in the newspaper
... ."26 The court, however, insisting that statutes in derogation of the
18. E.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (Baldwin 1970).
19. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(l) (1954); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (MeKinney
Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330 (Supp. 1971).
20. For other cases interpreting newsmen's privilege statutes see Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970) (discussed at note 44 infra), and Lipps v. State, 258 N.E.2d 622 (Ind. 1970),
which held that a criminal defendant could not object to a reporter's testifying about information
disclosed to him in confidence since the privilege could be invoked only by the newsman.
21. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
22. Id. at 36-38, 193 A.2d at 184-86.
23. 136 Cal. App. 2d 816, 289 P.2d 537 (1955).
24. Id. at 817-18, 289 P.2d at 538.
25. 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
26. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2:97-11 (1939).
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common law be strictly construed, required the editor to answer since the
inquiry went "not to the source, but to the messenger.
'27
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
Constitutional protection for newsmen's privilege under the first
amendment guarantee of freedom of the press was first sought in 1958.
In Garland v. Torre,"8 a reporter, questioned in a libel suit, refused to
reveal the identity of a broadcasting official she had quoted in her
newspaper column. The reporter was found in contempt of court, and on
appeal she argued that forcing her to reveal her sources of information
would encroach upon the freedom of the press under the first amendment
because it would restrain the flow of news from source to press to
public. 2 19 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held that the
question "went to the heart of the plaintiff's claim" 30 and that if
freedom of the press were involved, it "must give place under the
Constitution to a paramount public interest in the fair administration of
justice. ' ' 31 Subsequent decisions followed Torre in denying first
amendment protection to the privilege, and, as in Torre, cases appealed
to the United States Supreme Court were denied certiorari.
3 2
Constitutional protection for the privilege was first clearly
recognized in 1970 in Caldwell v. United States.3 New York Times
reporter Earl Caldwell, a black journalist and a specialist in reporting on
the Black Panther Party, raised the privilege in refusing to appear and
testify about the Party in answer to a federal grand jury subpoena.
Caldwell moved to quash the subpoena, arguing that if he testified he
would lose the confidence of his sources, and that the flow of news to the
public would thus be impeded. The federal district court denied his
motion, but gave him a protective order, holding that when the grand
jury power of testimonial compulsion may impinge upon or repress first
amendment rights, the power shall not be exercised "until there has been
a clear showing of a compelling and overriding national interest that
27. 129 N.J.L. at 487, 30 A.2d at 426. Subsequently, the New Jersey legislature broadened
the statute to protect not only the source, but also "the author, means, agency, or person from or
through whom" information was obtained. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (Supp. 1970).
28. 259 F.2d 545, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). See generally Annot., 7 A.L.R. 3d 591
(1966).
29. 259 F.2d at 547-48.
30. Id. at 550.
31. Id. at 549.
32. E.g., Buchanan v. Oregon, 392 U.S. 905, denying cert. to 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729
(1968); Murphy v. Colorado, 365 U.S. 843 (1961).
33. 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
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cannot be served by alternate means."u The court ruled that Caldwell
was not required to reveal confidential sources or information.
Specifically, he was not required to answer questions about information
given to him by the Panthers.
Although partially protected, Caldwell appealed, seeking not only
to avoid testifying before the grand jury but also to avoid appearing. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled for Caldwell.3 The court initially
agreed that forcing disclosure of information obtained in confidence
from the Black Panthers would drive a wedge of distrust and silence
between the media and the militants, hampering the news-gathering
process.3 In weighing the loss to the grand jury's investigative function
against injury to first amendment freedoms, the court stressed the
societal interest served by freedom of the press-the public's right to
information. Compelling the news gatherer to make his product
available, it said, is "to convert him after the fact into an investigative
agent of the Government, ' 37 invading the autonomy of the press. "To do
so where the result is to diminish their future capacity as news gatherers
is destructive of their public function.
' 38
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the requirement that the
government must show a compelling national interest that could not be
served by alternative means before insisting upon testimony from the
reporter, the court addressed itself to Caldwell's appeal of the judgment
that he must appear before the grand jury to answer questions not
privileged. Again it sketched the suspicion and loss of trust among Black
Panthers that would attach to the process, this time merely by reason of
the reporter's attending a secret investigation. The privilege not to
answer certain questions, the court said, did not adequately protect first
amendment freedoms at stake in this case. The court found that the
privilege must be implemented as Caldwell requested or it would fail in
its purpose.39 The real issue was whether the government's need for
Caldwell's testimony on unprivileged subjects justified the injury
threatened to first amendment freedoms by requiring his mere
attendance. Caldwell's affidavit averred that except for what he had
already made public, there was nothing to which he could testify that
was not protected by the district court's order. The court said: "If this is
34. Application of Caldwell, 311 F. Supp. 358, 360 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
35. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), noted in 84 HARV. L. REV. 1536
(1971).
36. Id. at 1084.
37. Id. at 1086.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1088-89.
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true . . . appellant's response to the subpoena would be a barren
performance-one of no benefit to the Grand Jury. . . Since the cost
to the public of excusing his attendance is so slight, it may be said that
there is here no public interest of real substance in competition with the
First Amendment freedoms that are jeopardized." 40 The court
recognized that secret interrogation is essential to the grand jury process,
but reasoned that "implicit in the extraordinary nature of secret
interrogations, is the possibility of conflict with basic rights."'41 On a
showing "that the public's First Amendment right to be informed would
be jeopardized by requiring a journalist to submit to secret Grand Jury
interrogation, the Government must respond by demonstrating a
compelling need for the witness's presence before judicial process
properly can issue to require attendance. ' 42 The court emphasized that
the rule of this case was a narrow one. Not all news sources are as
sensitive as the Black Panther Party, and not every newsman enjoys the
trust of a sensitive source.
As the handle of constitutional protection afforded in the Caldwell
decisions was being seized by attorneys for other reporters caught in the
wave of subpoenas, a controversy under a newsmen's shield law was in
progress in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. Paul Branzburg, Louisville
Courier Journal reporter, watched two men convert marijuana to
hashish and wrote a story about it. When summoned to testify before the
grand jury, he refused to reveal the men's identity, pleading privilege
under the Kentucky shield law.43 He was held in contempt for his refusal,
and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed only eleven days after the
Caldwell decision.4 Branzburg had asked for a broad construction of
the statutory phrase "source of information," to include all knowledge
received by a newsman. The highest court of Kentucky, however, held
that "information" in the statute refers to the matters that a reporter
learns, and "source" refers to the method by which, or the person from
whom, the information is obtained .4 The court found that the source
alone is privileged. Since the testimony sought by the grand jury involved
the personal observations of the reporter, no privilege existed.
Less than two months later, Branzburg was again under subpoena.
This time the grand jury was seeking his testimony about articles
40. Id. at 1089.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (1969).
44. Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
45. Id. at 347.
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appearing in the Louisville newspaper concerning the illegal use of drugs.
Branzburg filed in circuit court a motion to quash the subpoena and
sought to be excused from appearing before the grand jury. His motion
was denied and he appealed.46 This time Branzburg sought constitutional
protection, relying on Caldwell. The Kentucky court, however,
distinguished Caldwell on two grounds. First, Caldwell had produced
substantial evidence that his appearance before a grand jury would have
a chilling effect upon his sources, but Branzburg merely alleged that the
drug-using portion of the public would stop furnishing information to
him. Secondly, Caldwell's affidavit said that the only information he
had would be privileged by the protective order granted him and his
appearance would thus be an exercise in futility, but Branzburg filed no
similar affidavit.
47
Although the court concluded that Branzburg was not within the
Ninth Circuit principle, it went on to state that it had misgivings about
the Caldwell decision, terming it "a drastic departure from the generally
recognized rule .... ,,4 The Kentucky court noted that the express
language of the first amendment prohibits the enactment of any law
abridging freedom of the press or freedom of speech whereas the
Caldwell opinion rests on the public's first amendment right to be
informed. The court balanced the questioned first amendment interest
against the interest inherent in the grand jury, an instrument that
insulates citizens from overzealous prosecution and investigates crime
and matters detrimental to the public interest. It is much less evident, the
court concluded, that compulsory attendance before a grand jury
infringes first amendment rights than it is that restricting the power to
compel attendance directly and obviously impedes the grand jury's
functioning.49 The decision to deny Branzburg's petition was unanimous.
Within a week after the Branzburg decision, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court, in In re Pappas,5 0 flatly denied the
constitutional protection that the Kentucky court had merely
questioned. Paul Pappas, a New Bedford television newsman, refused to
tell a grand jury what he had seen and heard at Black Panther
headquarters during civil disturbances in New Bedford. On motion to
quash a second subpoena, the superior court ruled that he had no
privilege and must respond and testify. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial
46. Branzburg v. Meigs, No. W-29-71 (Ky., Jan. 22, 1971).
47. Id. at 5-6.
48. Id. at 6 (relying upon the Torre decision).
49. Id. at 7.
50. 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971).
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Court found that the cases in general supported the view that privileges
against disclosure are serious interferences with rational investigation
and are justified only if accompanied by valuable social benefits.51 The
court expressed no concern that requiring a newsman to testify about
facts within his knowledge would infringe first amendment rights,
stating that any effect on the free flow of news is "indirect, theoretical,
and uncertain, and relates at most to the future gathering of news. 15 2 In
the court's view, the Caldwell case largely disregarded important
government interests in enforcing criminal law for the public benefit.
The newsmen's protection lies not in the Constitution, but in judicial
supervision to prevent "oppressive, unnecessary, irrelevant, and other
improper inquiry and investigation . . . ",1 and the burden rests on a
witness to establish that the grand jury inquiry is improper.
Now twice rejected, the Caldwell reasoning within a week was
recognized in a state without a privilege statute. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court, in State v. Knops,- recognized constitutional protection for the
newsmen's privilege in general, but denied its application to the facts of
the case. A grand jury was investigating alleged arson at Whitewater
State University and an explosion at the University of Wisconsin that
killed one person. Kaleidoscope, an "underground" newspaper, printed
a story entitled "The Bombers Tell Why and What Next . .. .
Knops, editor of the underground paper, appeared in response to
subpoena, but refused on first amendment grounds to answer five
questions concerning persons with whom he had talked about the alleged
arson and the bombing. Appealing a contempt conviction, Knops did
not ask immunity from appearance before the grand jury but argued
that he should not be required to reveal confidential sources and
information. He relied on Caldwell in alleging that disclosure would
inhibit the free flow of news to the public, thereby damaging first
amendment interests. The court reasoned that even if the premises
underlying the Caldwell decision were accepted, the need for answers to
the five questions was overriding. "[T]he appellant's information could
lead to the apprehension and conviction of the person or persons who
committed a major criminal offense resulting in the death of an innocent
person." 5 Although the court conceded that curtailment of the free flow
51. See Preface to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE at 7.
52. 266 N.E.2d at 302.
53. Id. at 303. In his supervisory role in relation to the grand jury, the judge has discretion to
prevent excessive or unnecessary interference with the legitimate interests of witnesses.
54. 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971).
55. Id. at 99.
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of information could occur, it reasoned that "in a disorderly society
such as we are currently experiencing it may well be appropriate to
curtail in a very minor way the free flow of information, if such
curtailment will serve the purpose of restoring an atmosphere in which
all of our fundamental freedoms can flourish."56 A fundamental
freedom that the public presently lacks, it said, "is the freedom to walk
into public buildings without having to fear for one's life."57
Apart from an absolute constitutional privilege, Knops argued that
the state must demonstrate the lack of an alternative method, less
restrictive of first amendment rights, by which the objective could be
served. In discussing this contention, the Wisconsin court rejected the
Caldwell determination that the state must show there are no alternative
means by which the information can be obtained. "We think that if
there are alternative methods of gaining this information, appellant
should point them out. He asks too much when he asks the court to
presume that state officers could gain this information elsewhere ....
The mere fact that the culprits are still at large is nearly conclusive proof
that the state does not know who they are." 58
Justice Heffernan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
approved the findings of constitutional protection for a newsman's
privilege, and agreed with the finding of contempt, but strictly on the
basis of the arson at Whitewater State University. He argued that since
official records showed Wisconsin and United States officials had said
under oath that they knew who caused the explosion at the University of
Wisconsin, and since the United States Attorney had stated that
Knops's testimony in that regard was now superfluous, there was no
compelling need for Knops's testimony about the bombing. He also
found a contradiction in the majority's willingness to "curtail in a very
minor way the free flow of information" while at the same time
compelling "the production of information" in the case of overriding
state interest. 9
IV. OVERVIEW
For the reporter on the firing-line, the case for an absolute
newsmen's privilege under the Constitution is likely to have strong
appeal."0 Nevertheless, newspapers as well as the courts have shown that
56. Id. at 98,
57. Id.
58. Id. at 99.
59. Id. at 100 & n.I.
60. For a discussion of the "absolute" position see Elliott & Osborn, The Case for Total
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they realize the need to balance first amendment rights against others. In
Wisconsin, where the privilege sought by the underground editor would
have seemingly blocked access to information about violent deaths,
bombing, and alleged arson, eleven of the state's 36 daily newspapers
editorialized on the Knops case." Nine expressed approval of the
decision, usually on grounds that freedom of the press places "an extra
burden on a journalist to be responsible to the public interest," '62 while
two disapproved. One editorial, criticizing the majority's determination
that it was "appropriate to curtail in a very minor way the free flow of
information"6 3 so that all freedoms could flourish, said: "This has been
the eternal cry of totalitarians since man left the caves."" This editorial
suggested that "the court found it easy to rationalize its decision because
it was dealing with a radical underground journalist." A second
newspaper found the decision a "legal landmark" because no state
supreme court had previously held that the Constitution protects the
journalist's confidential sources; but the editorial criticized the
majority's application of its rule and agreed with the partial dissent.66
In summarizing the implications of decisions since Earl Caldwell
went before the federal district court, some newsmen's negatives are an
appropriate starting point. The constitutional protection has not
penetrated Massachusetts. There is not even the concession of Torre that
freedom of the press, even though subordinate to the principle of the fair
administration of justice, might be involved in a newsman's claim to
privilege. For now, Massachusetts newsmen will have to rely on
presiding judges' supervision to keep investigations from becoming
oppressive, unnecessarily broad, or irrelevant. There is not quite so flat a
denial in Kentucky. Nevertheless, the Kentucky court doubted the
Caldwell rule and questioned whether the public has a first amendment
Privilege, AM. Soc'y oF NEWSPAPERS EDITORS BULL., Sept. 1970, at 4-7. Several state statutes
restrict the range of circumstances in which the privilege applies, but apparently make it absolute.
See note 12 supra.
61. Appleton-Neenah-Menasha Post-Crescent, Feb. 9, 1971, § A, at 4, col. 1; Beloit Daily
News, Feb. 4, 1971, at 6, col. 1; Green Bay Press-Gazette, Feb. 4, 1971, § A, at 6, col. 1; LaCrosse
Tribune, Feb. 3, 1971. at 6, col. 1; Madison Capital-Times, Feb. 4, 1971, at 38, col. 1; Milwaukee
J., Feb. 4, 1971, at 20, col. 1; Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 4, 1971, at 16, col. 1; Rhinelander Daily
News, Feb. 5, 1971, at 4, col. 1; Waukesha Freeman, Feb. 8, 1971, at 8, col. 1; Wausau Record-
Herald, quoted in Antigo Daily J., Feb. 10, 1971, at 4; Wisconsin State J., Feb. 4, 1971, at 10, col.
I. Of the 36 daily papers, 34 were examined.
62. Milwaukee Sentinel, Feb. 4, 1971, at 16, col. 1.
63. 183 N.W.2d at 98.
64. Madison Capital-Times, Feb. 4, 1971, at 38, col. I.
65. Id.
66. Milwaukee J., Feb. 4, 1971, at 20, col. 1.
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right to be informed. Kentucky newsmen must rely on their state statute,
freshly construed to hold their privilege tightly to the source, not to the
information. As for the Caldwell decision itself, it provides a
constitutional protection heavily qualified and distinctly less protective
of source confidentiality than some state statutes. Several state statutes
contain absolute prohibitions against compelling reporters to disclose
the sources of any information procured by them for publication.67
Caldwell's protection, however, was issued only after careful
consideration of the facts in the case and a finding that his special
relation to a highly sensitive source warranted the shield. Further, a
balancing of interests approach, with its attendant uncertainty, was a
clear factor in both Caldwell and Knops. In Knops, the reporter's side of
the scale was outweighed. Under the "absolute" privilege statutes, how-
ever, there is no reason for courts to balance the claim to source protec-
tion against the demands of the proper administration of justice.
The Knops decision, finally, contains language that the news media
may consider the unkindest cut of all. The Wisconsin majority turned
the concept of "the public's right to know" against the newsman in
holding that he may not keep secret his knowledge of major, specific
crimes; ironically, the "public's right to know" has been the rallying-
cry, slogan, and banner for journalists attacking secrecy in government
for the past twenty years. 8 It is probably safe to say that no professional
undertaking during this period has so occupied newsmen as their drive
for an end to secrecy, cast as a battle in the name of the public and
variously called "access to government information," "freedom of
information," and "the public's right to know." This is not to say that
the societal value in the future free flow of information never justifies the
journalist's secrecy, but rather to suggest that in this confrontation with
government, the secrecy shoe is plainly on the other foot. The
government, as well as the press, has warrant to argue that its functions
advance the "public's right to know."
On the positive side, the Caldwell decision contradicts the uniform
holdings against a constitutional protection and goes beyond the
privilege statutes to shield the reporter from even appearing before a
grand jury. Further, it privileges him not to reveal "confidential
associations, sources or information," a broader range of material than
67. See statutes cited note 12 supra. In addition to these statutes, Pennsylvania and
California courts have construed "source" broadly, to the advantage of the privilege. See notes 21 &
23 supra and accompanying text.




is covered by most statutes, which generally protect only the "source of
information." 9
In addition, the Knops decision went briefly to the troublesome
question of who is a journalist. 7 Statutes uniformly specify that the
privilege is limited to persons who gather news for one or more of the
"recognized" news media. Did Knops, editor of an "underground"
paper, which often featured radical polemic and ridiculed religious and
sexual mores, warrant protection? Was his publication a "newspaper?"
The Wisconsin court noted it was undisputed that Kaleidoscope was a
newspaper and that Knops was a journalist.
71
Perhaps most importantly, the language of the Caldwell decision
unmistakably identifies the news-gathering function as a part of the
journalistic process entitled to first amendment protection.
72
Constitutional protection for news-gathering has advanced slowly.73 It
has been denied in earlier decisions on privilege, 74 supported occasionally
in the context of access to government, 75 but ordinarily denied there,7
and supported by analogy in circumstances not involving news media.
77
News-gathering, a complex process itself, in turn embraces other
69. The New York statute may furnish protection for almost as broad a range of material. It
provides that no newsman shall be judged in contempt for refusing "to disclose any news or the
source of any such news coming into his possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news for
publication or to be published ...or for broadcast .... " N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h
(McKinney Supp. 1971) (emphasis added). Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in In re
Taylor, 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963), construed the word "source" in the statute broadly. See
note 21 supra.
70. See Comment, supra note 2, at 129.
71. 183 N.W.2d at 95. It may be doubted that journalists of "establishment" media would
necessarily count protection for unorthodox practitioners a "positive" development in privilege.
While the Knops decision was pending, this writer heard several editors question whether an
"underground" journal could qualify for the protection.
72. See 434 F.2d at 1086, 1089. For support for this position see Guest & Stanzler, The
ConstitutionalArgumentfor Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18,29 (1969).
73. The historical development in the United States is treated in Nelson, Introduction to
FREEDOM OF THE PREss FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT at xix-I (H. Nelson ed. 1967).
74. See note 32 supra.
75. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on other grounds. 299
U.S. 269 (1936); Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186 (D.R.I. 1950), affd on other
grounds, 190 F.2d 760 (lst Cir. 1951); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
76. Seymour v. United States, 373 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F.2d 905
(D.C. Cir. 1959); Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); Trimble v.
Johnson, 173 F. Supp. 651 (D.D.C. 1953); In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956); United
Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
77. See Guest & Stanzier, supra note 72 at 29-36; Comment, supra note 2, at 124-29. First
amendment protection, of course, has come more quickly to other parts of the publishing process,
granting protection from prepublication censorship, from interference with printing and
distribution, and from punishment after publication.
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complex processes, such as obtaining access to information,
interviewing, researching records, and the use of devices such as
cameras, microphones, and tape recorders. If news-gathering deserves
constitutional protection, many of its components await future
consideration under the first amendment.
Take access, for example. If the Constitution protects a news
gatherer's privilege to conceal his sources in the name of his future
capacity to obtain information for the public, it may as well arm a news
gatherer with the power to gain access to government records and
meetings in the name of his present and future capacity to obtain
information for the public about what its servants do. Newsmen have
argued unsuccessfully for years, that a constitutional right of access is a
necessary part of gathering the news. 78 It is conceivable that Caldwell
could serve as an instrument to force reappraisal of first amendment
protection for access and consideration of a range of other news
gatherers' practices.
In the name of the public's need for a free flow of information, why
should constitutional protection stop at supporting access to government
information? May there not also be a newsmen's right of access to the
records of industry, labor, and privately owned hospitals? Is it less
important that the public know "the facts" about industrial pollution
than that it know "the facts" about the continuing activity of the Black
Panther Party?
Perhaps such speculation is frivolous at a moment when three
petitioners have been granted Supreme Court review of constitutional
protection for the news gatherer who labors in the name of the public.79
Yet the Supreme Court's elevation of the "public" principle in other
first amendment spheres of recent years has been striking. The chief
vehicle has been the doctrine first expressed in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,"0 a case heavily restricting the individual's right to recover libel
damages in view of a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
78. H. CROSS, supra note 68, at xiii-xiv; M. KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE
PEOPLE 192-93 (1957); J. WIGGINS, supra note 68; Scher & Jacob, Access to Information: Recent
Legal Problems, 37 JOURNALISM Q. 41 (1960).
79. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W.
3478 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 1114); Branzburg v. Meigs, No. W-29-7 (Ky., Jan. 22, 1971), cert.
granted sub nom. Branzburg v. Hayes, 39 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No. 1381); In re
Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971), cert. granted, 39 U.S.L.W. 3478 (U.S. May 4, 1971) (No.
1434).
80. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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open . *..."81 Under the Sullivan doctrine, only the malicious
untruth-not the negligent or careless error-can be the basis for
recovery when various "public" factors are involved.8 2 Limiting first the
public official's right to recovery, the doctrine subsequently was
expanded to include "public figures,"' ' and private individuals swept
unwillingly into public prominence8 Now decisions are following in
spirit the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Rosenblatt v.
Baer," in which he said "the question is whether a public issue . . . is
involved."'3 Recent cases have reinforced the pre-eminence of the
public's need for information about matters of great public interest over
the right of the corporation or citizen to recover in libel.8 7 May industry,
like nonofficial citizens who take active part in public affairs, be "as
much in the public domain as any so-called officeholder?" s
As the Sullivan doctrine extends constitutional protection for
printing under the "public" rationale, Caldwell extends it for news-
gathering under the same principle. If Caldwell survives Supreme Court
review, it seems likely that journalists will carry its reasoning beyond the
realm of newsmen's privilege to seek first amendment support for the
right of access and other aspects of news-gathering.
81. Id. at 270.
82. Id. at 279-80.
83. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat
Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966); Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.
1964).
84. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
85. 383 U.S. 75, 88 (1966).
86. Id. at 91.
87. Time, Inc. v. Ragano, 427 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1970); Bon Air Hotel v. Time, Inc., 426
F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970); Time, Inc. v. McLaney, Inc., 406 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1969); United
Medical Laboratories v. CBS, 404 F.2d 706 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921 (1969). The
first amendment thrust of the Sullivan case and its successors goes to "the right of the public to have
an interest in the matter involved and its right therefore to know or be informed about it." Id. at
710.
88. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 89 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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